The reduction theory of David F. Hendry provides a comprehensive probabilistic framework for the analysis and classification of the reductions (simplifications) associated with empirical econometric models. However, it is unable to provide an analysis on the same underlying probability space of the first reduction-and hence the subsequent reductions-given a commonplace theory of social reality, namely the joint hypotheses that the course of history is indeterministic, that history does not repeat itself, and that the future depends on the past. As a solution this essay proposes that the elements of the underlying outcome space in Hendry's theory are interpreted as indeterministic worlds made up of historically inherited particulars. The solution permits several new reductions to be studied within the framework-all on the same underlying probability space, and enables a history based version of probabilistic causality.
Introduction
When Trygve Haavelmo suggested that the n observations in a dataset could "be considered as one observation of n variables. . . following an n-dimensional joint probability law" (1944, p. iii) , his main aim was to convert more economists to the praxis of evaluating economic theories against empirical economic data using statistical techniques. The deeper question about how the joint n-dimensional probability distribution was related to reality, however, he remained agnostic about. In his own words, the existence of such a joint probability distribution "may be purely hypothetical" (same place, p. iii).
1 Although Haavelmo's ideas had a profound and immediate impact on contemporary economic analysis it nevertheless took until the 1970s and 1980s before a systematic approach to the study of the relation between reality and models thereof in terms of probability concepts developed in econometrics. At the centre of several important contributions during these years, including Mouchart (1980, 1985) , Hendry and Richard (1982) , and Florens et al. (1990) , was the notion of a "probabilistic reduction", that is, the idea of replacing a complex probabilistic structure with a simpler one through marginalisation and/or conditioning, and led to the development of important econometric concepts like weak exogeneity, strong exogeneity and super exogeneity (see Engle et al. (1983) ).
The reduction theory of David F. Hendry (1995, Chapter 9) , where the term reduction is used in a broader way than originally, provides a comprehensive probabilistic framework for the analysis and classification of the simplifications associated with empirical models, and underpins the general-to-specific (GETS) methodology for empirical modelling and model evaluation, see Campos et al. (2005) for a comprehensive overview.
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In Hendry's own words the reduction theory "seeks to explain 1 Later Haavelmo quotes Pareto: "Il n'y a pas de proposition qu'on ne puisse certifier vraie sous certaines conditions,à determiner" (same place, p. 1). This might be taken as an indication on why he was agnostic about the existence or "truthfulness" of such a joint distribution. Differently put, agreeing with Pareto that truth is a complex issue and highly dependent on tests for it, Haavelmo chose to defer the topic rather than engaging into a detailed and possibly futile discussion.
2 Chapter 9 in Hendry (1995) is a revised version of Cook and Hendry (1994) , which is based on Hendry and Richard (1982) .
the origin of empirical models in terms of reduction operations conducted implicitly on the DGP [data generating process] to induce the relevant empirical model" (1995, p. 344) . Starting with the joint probability distribution of the "complete set" of theory "variables relevant to the economy under investigation" (same place, p. 345), the reduction theory distinguishes between twelve reduction operations which ultimately leads to the empirical model. Although Hendry's theory is a powerful and comprehensive framework for the analysis of the relation between reality and models thereof, it is nevertheless unable to provide an analysis on the same probability space of the first stage-and hence of the subsequent stages-of reduction given a commonplace theory of social reality. The commonplace theory consists of the joint hypotheses that, literally, a) the course of history is indeterministic, b) history does not repeat itself, and c) the future depends on the past (historical inheritance). In philosophical jargon, that the human world is made up of indeterministic, historically supervenient particulars.
In this essay a certain structure on the underlying outcome space is proposed with the consequence that the underlying probability space remains the same throughout all reductions in Hendry's theory. The proposed structure consists of devising the outcome set as consisting of possible worlds made up of indeterministic and historically inherited particulars, and provides several gains and new reduction possibilities of which only a few are explored here. First, the formulation or choice of theory variables can be seen as a simplification or some sort of "pre-marginalisation" of variables, and can thus be interpreted as the perspective from which we study an issue. Second, ways in which theory models can be analysed as reductions are put forward. Third, a probabilistic definition of the absence of measurement error is enabled. Fourth, a history based probabilistic definition of indeterministic causality that nests discrete, continuous, interval and process notions of causality is proposed.
Fifth, mathematical expectation conditional on an information set is re-interpreted.
More generally devising the outcome set as consisting of indeterministic worlds made up of historically inherited particulars provides a bridge between econometric (/probabilistic) reduction analysis and metaphysics, that is, the part of philosophy that deals with what there exists and its nature. There is already a voluminous philosophical literature that employs the idea of possible worlds to shed light on various metaphysical issues, and by providing a bridge between these two literatures econometrics can benefit from these insights.
The rest of this essay is organised into five sections. In the next, section 2, the most relevant parts of Hendry's reduction theory for the current purposes are detailed. Section 3 describes and motivates the structure of the outcome space that is proposed. In section 4 the formulation of theory variables is treated as a reduction and linked to contributions of Max Weber, Joseph Schumpeter and Gunnar Myrdal on non-objective aspects of economic investigation. Also in the same section, ways in which theory models can be analysed as reductions are proposed, and probabilistic definitions of the absence of measurement error are put forward. Section 5 formulates a history based probabilistic definition of indeterministic causality, and re-interprets mathematical expectation conditional on an information set in light of the definition.
Finally, section 6 concludes and gives a suggestion for further research.
The first stage in Hendry's reduction theory
The purpose of Hendry's reduction framework is "to explain the origin of empirical models in terms of reduction operations conducted implicitly on the DGP" (1995, p. 344) , and his framework details twelve reductions whose order is not unique.
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Since the focus here is on the first stage I concentrate on this in what follows.
The most informative account of the first stage of reduction is given in a single paragraph in chapter 9 of Dynamic Econometrics (1995) . Most of the paragraph is about the concepts and actions involved in the first stage, so it seems useful to reproduce it here almost in its entirety. Note however that I have modified Hendry's notation in order to retain a consistent notation throughout this essay.
Most importantly, random variables and vectors appear in capitals to distinguish them from their realisations, which are denoted in small letters later in the essay.
The passage is:
"The analysis begins with the complete set of random variables {U * t } relevant to the economy under investigation over a time span t = 1, . . . , T , where the superscript * denotes a perfectly measured variable U * = (U * 1 , . . . , U * T ), defined on the probability space (Ω, F, P ) . . . The {U * t } comprise all the potential variables from the economic mechanism under study which operates at the level of U * , and hence the vector U * t comprises details of every economic action of every agent at time t in all the regions of the geographical space relevant to the analysis. However, many of the {U * ti } variables are either unobserved or badly measured, so the term data is not strictly applicable to U * t . The mapping from the economic mechanism to the data-generation process through the measurement system is the first reduction, which can lose a vast amount of information, and introduce inaccuracy but leads to a data-set which is denoted by {U t }. At a conceptual level, all variables {U * ti } are assumed to be measured as {U ti } although for some variables, the level of quantification may be low, possibly even an artificial entry of zero. The probability space (Ω, F, P ) is transformed by the measurement process (usually markedly) . . . "-Hendry (1995, p. 345) Thus the starting point of Hendry's reduction theory is a set of theory variables denoted U * defined on the probability space (Ω, F, P ), and together U * and (Ω, F, P ) constitute the "economic mechanism" or "theory mechanism". Furthermore, the actions of collecting and recording the data, that is, the measurement process, produces a dataset U defined on an altered probability space (Ω , F , P ). This altered probability space (Ω , F , P ) together with the data variables U is called the "data generating process" (DGP). Schematically the first stage of reduction is summarised in table 1.
3 The outcome set as consisting of possible worlds If (Ω, F, P ) denotes a probability space with Ω, F and P being the outcome space, the event space and the probability function, respectively, then in what follows the elements ω ∈ Ω will be referred to as "worlds" or "possible worlds". The purpose of this section is to formulate and motivate the proposed structure of the worlds ω.
The proposed structure serves as some sort of social ontology, that is, a theory of the nature of social reality, and is contained in definition 4 in the last subsection of this section. The preceding subsections provide the details that leads up to definition 4. The first subsection 3.1 presents the idea of a possible world which in philosophy has proved very useful in analysing, discussing and communicating many philosophical ideas and theories, and shows that there is no loss of generality in interpreting the ω as worlds. Then, subsections 3.2 and 3.3 formalise the ideas of contingent particularism and historically inherited particulars, respectively. Finally, subsection 3.4 contains the definition of outcomes sets consisting of indeterministic worlds made up of historically inherited particulars.
Possible worlds
The idea of a world is normally credited to the German philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 -1716) (Crane 1995) .
5
Intuitively a world contains everything in the past, everything in the present and everything in the future, or in Leibniz' own words "the entire sequence and the entire collection of all existing things" (Theodicy, par. 8, G VI 107. Quoted in Parkinson 1995, p. 213) . In contemporary philosophy the notion is often associated with David Lewis , who describes worlds as consisting of "the planet Earth, the solar system, the entire Milky Way, the remote galaxies we see through telescopes. . . Anything at any distance at all is to be included. Likewise the world is inclusive in time. No long-gone ancient Romans, no long-gone pterodactyls, no long-gone primordial clouds of plasma are too far in the past, nor are the dead dark stars too far in the future, to be part of this same world"- Lewis (1986b, p. 1) Where Lewis differs from Leibniz is with respect to how things are connected and with respect to the existence of other worlds. Whereas Leibniz was a determinist and believed in a single world, Lewis was a non-determinist and believed in the rather unusual thesis that non-actual, possible worlds exist objectively and independent of thought because "philosophy [his own?] goes more easily" if we believe so (1986b, p.
5 Leibniz was religious and used the idea to argue that the world is perfect because among all the possible worlds God must have chosen the most perfect one, a view that was ridiculed by Voltaire in his play Candide (Crane 1995) . In today's philosophical usage, however, the term usually carries no religious connotation. vii).
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Although I take side with Lewis in the determinism vs. indeterminism debate my view differs most certainly from Lewis' regarding the existence of non-actual worlds, since I only see them as useful mind-constructs not existing independent of thought.
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But do we really need the whole world for the purpose of econometric reduction analysis? Spatially, yes, if we want to ensure a complete analysis, but it is not necessary to be all-including backwards and forward in time. Differently put, the worlds must contain everything between a start point and an end point, but the portions outside this interval are not really necessary although including them changes little. So henceforth a world ω is devised as a non-stochastic continuous time process {s(t) : t ∈ [0, ∞)} of worldly states-of-affairs s(t). The number 0 denotes an arbitrary starting point, say, yesterday at midnight or four million years ago, and is not restrictive. However, bounding worlds temporally backwards in time entails an implicit conditioning on the realised history preceding 0. Backwards bounding thus means probabilities acquire an interpretation of special interest, but apart from this the only function bounding serves is to simplify the exposition.
Interpreting ω as worlds retains the intuitive use of probability algebra. For example, if we want to say that A ∈ F denotes the event that (say) 10% of the labour force of an economy is unemployed at t, then the only change in interpreting the ω as a world is that A now denotes the set of all worlds in which 10% of the labour force of a certain economy is unemployed at t. More formally, A = {ω : 10% unemployed at t}. If the worlds are bounded backwards, then the interpretation becomes that A denotes the set of all worlds in which 10% of an economy is unemployed at t given the history of the world up to t = 0. Another common practice is to interpret the outcome set Ω as a set of possible "states-of-affairs" or "facts". In possible worlds 6 The whole book is a defence of this thesis but see in particular pp. vii-ix and pp. 133-135. For a brief and amusing summary of other philosophers' reactions to Lewis's thesis, see Hawthorn (1995, footnote 24 pp. 23-24) .
7 For further philosophical issues and references regarding the idea of a possible world useful starting points are Forbes (1995) and Moravcsik (1995) . For an alternative but related use of the idea of a possible world by an economist, see Kluve (2004) .
terminology a state-of-affair or fact at t is now the set of all worlds in which a certain state-of-affairs or fact attains at t. Finally, the possible worlds interpretation also accommodates "interval" events. Returning to an analysis of unemployment, we may want to devise an event A equal to the set of worlds in which 10% of the labour force of an economy is registered as unemployed over the time interval, say, [t 0 , t 1 ] with t 0 < t 1 .
Contingent particularism
"I am inclined", in the words of Geoffrey Hawthorn, "to the view that the human world consists of contingent particulars" (1995, p. 10) . Contingency refers to the thesis that social events are not connected in a deterministic manner, a question that has occupied philosophers for thousands of years. There are at least two philosophical literatures of relevance for this issue. The first is concerned with whether human being is endowed with a socalled "free will" and if so what kind of free will.
The second literature is the socalled "philosophy of mind" literature and starts from two seemingly contradictory views. On the one hand that human being presumably is made up of a finite number of indivisible objects-usually referred to as particles, and on the other hand that human being is capable of a presumably infinite number of mental states (imagination, thought, etc.).
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Depending on one's views on free will and on the relationship between mind and matter, a variety of possible views on how social events are connected is possible. Since I am unlikely to convince the reader of my belief in the indeterminism thesis unless she or he is already a believer I merely state the thesis as some sort of axiom that I start from. Formally, with 8 An entry on "free will" is contained in virtually any philosophy or metaphysics dictionary, see for example Honderich (1995) or Kim and Sosa (1995) , and usually contains suggestions for further reading. An accessible introduction to these issues is Searle (1991) , which is based on the author's BBC lectures. Useful introductions to the philosophy of mind are Kim (1996) and Heil (1998) , the second being more advanced than the first. A good text on the relation between mind and recent biological currents is Ruse (1988) . Texts that consider themselves to specifically address issues of social ontology are Ruben (1985) and Pettit (1993) . A useful introduction to metaphysics as it is often conceived, a form of category theory, is Loux (1998). respect to the probability space (Ω, F, P ), indeterminism is simply characterised by Ω containing more than one world ω, that is, part a) in definition 4.
The meaning of the philosophical idea of a "particular" is best understood when contrasted with its opposite, a "universal". In brief, something is said to be of particular nature if there exists only one of its kind, whereas something is said to be of universal nature if it is one out of several of its kind or type. Another way to put it is that a particular refers to the unique and non-repeatable, whereas a universal refers to the repeatable. In the current context particularism is the thesis that, literally, history does not repeat itself (no two points in time are exactly equal in all respects).
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Formally this may be stated as follows:
Ω is said to be made up of particulars if for all pairs t, t ∈ [0, ∞) such that t = t and s(t), s(t ) ∈ ω, then s(t) = s(t ).

Historically inherited particulars
A further thesis I start from is that the current and the future depend on and inherit the characteristics of the past. Differently put, every turn history takes contributes in one or another way to the characteristics of the worldly state-of-affairs of the future. This thesis I shall call "historical inheritance", but before providing a formal definition of this property we need the idea of a worldly state-of-affairs process up to t: Definition 2. Worldly state-of-affairs process.
The process ω t = {s(a) : a < t, t ∈ (0, ∞)} ω is said to be a worldly states-of-affairs process up to but not including t.
Intuitively ω t is a history up to t and note that the number 0 is not included in the interval (0, ∞) in order to ensure that ω t is non-empty. We can now define historical inheritance. 
In words, if two worlds contains the same history up to t (but not at t), then the two worlds differ from each other in at least one respect at every point in the future, that is, from t and onwards. 
Outcome sets consisting of indeterministic worlds made up of historically inherited particulars
The first property a) essentially states that the course of history is indeterministic. If Ω contained only a single world, then this would imply that no other worlds are possible and therefore that the course of history is deterministic. The second property b) makes use of the notion states-of-affairs at t which is denoted s(t), and essentially states that history does not repeat itself. The third and final property c) imposes a certain structure on the history-does-not-repeat itself property. Specifically, it ensures that future properties are shaped by the past, thus the terminology historical inheritance. It should be underlined that definition 4 constitutes a very general description of the nature of social reality. Indeed, many simpler ontologies-both deterministic and indeterministic-can be obtained as a restriction on the worlds ω and the outcome space Ω.
Hendry's reduction theory revisited
The probability space in definition 4-denoted (Ω, F, P )-provides the starting point of this section. The probability space enables new types of reductions-all on the same underlying probability space, and a revised version of the first stages in Hendry's reduction theory is summarised in table 2. This section proceeds in three steps. In subsection 4.1 the formulation of theory variables is treated as some sort of pre-marginalisation or "perspective" from which we study reality through, a reduction that can be interpreted and linked with contributions by Max Weber, Joseph Schumpeter and Gunnar Myrdal. Subsection 4.2 develops concepts and ideas useful for the analysis of theory models as reductions. Finally, subsection 4.3 proposes formal definitions of the absence of measurement error, which are enabled by the property that the underlying probability space does not change due to the measurement process.
Formulation of theory variables as a reduction
Consider a set of theory variables U * defined on the probability space (Ω, F, P ). If the number of theory variables {U * ti } is finite for all t, then U * can be interpreted as the theory variables selected for or considered in an economic investigation.
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The underlying probability space does not change over time because all change is accounted for by the worlds ω, and the formulation of theory variables can be seen as some sort of reduction or pre-marginalisation with a methodological interpretation.
A useful notion for this purpose is the theoretical probability function, denoted P * , which is defined as the probability function associated with the smallest σ-field generated by the events of the theory variable. For example, in the simple case of a single theory variable U * that attains two values u * 1 and u * 2 , the smallest σ-field
In practice the number of theory variables at t is always finite. If we were to study the case of non-finiteness, however, many kinds of non-technical issues of conceptualisation and philosophy arise. Normative analysis is about how things should be, it is said, whereas positive analysis is value-independent and "objective" investigation of how things are. But is positive analysis entirely objective? Do we not, in any investigation, choose which questions to address, which portions of social reality to study, and which categorical schemes, concepts, techniques and language to employ? The idea that these choices are non-objective in some sense is old and not controversial. Examples of economists who held this view are Max Weber (1994) , Joseph Schumpeter (1949) and Gunnar Myrdal (1953, pp. vii-viii; . Since a world contains everything and since the outcome set contains all the possible worlds, the formulation of theoretical variables U * and the associated theoretical probability function P * can be seen as reflecting some of these choices. In particular, the formulation of theoretical variables can be seen to reflect which portions of reality F * that are studied as opposed to others, or some sort of pre-marginalisation of the variables that are not studied.
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Specifically, the set F − F * can be interpreted as the events or portions of reality that are not studied. Differently put, the formulation of theoretical variables can be seen as the perspective or "conceptual lenses" we view reality with. For example, in delineating and defining theoretical price and theoretical quantity, then other aspects of the transaction process are not included in the analysis. This is clearly an abstraction, since an anthropologist or an institutional economist might be interested in whether 11 In this example it is assumed that {U * = u 1 } and {U * = u 2 } are mutually exlusive and complete, that is, {U * = u 1 }∩{U * = u 2 } = ∅ (mutual exclusivity) and {U * = u 1 }∪{U * = u 2 } = Ω (completeness).
12 The term pre-marginalisation is due to the fact that marginalisation of the unimportant-according to some criteria-variables of the set that is considered takes place later in the reduction theory of David F. Hendry. the parties engaged in any form of negotiation, whether there were implicit powerrelations governing the transaction process, or what the means of transactions were.
All this and many other aspects of the transaction are excluded from the analysis when the only theoretical variables delineated are price and quantity. With the modified probability space the selection of which portions of reality to analyse and the way they are depicted in terms of variables can be treated as a simplification. , and a natural question to ask is to what extent these restrictions hold. A straightforward answer is that sometimes they do and sometimes they do not, and we may denote C as the family of sets {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n , . . .} ⊂ F in which the crossrestrictions hold. Specifically, for all C n ∈ C such that P (C n ) > 0, 13 it is the case that
Theory models as reductions
and the probability that the cross-restrictions will hold is P (
14 In words, if we denote the conditional theoretical probability function for a given C n by P * C n , then ∞ n=1 C n is the set of possible worlds in which P T is equal to (or alternatively almost surely equal to) P * Cn , and the introduction of a theory model implies a probabilistic reduction whenever P ( 
In words, whether the probability of P T being "true" is greater, equal to or smaller than the probability of We restrict ourselves to sets C n such that P (C n ) > 0, because the sets C n where P (C n ) = 0 are probabilistically unimportant.
14 Strictly speaking, for the conditional probabilities to make sense, the theoretical probability function P * must be defined on a greater σ-field than F * . Specifically, P * is now defined on a σ-field generated by the events of the theory variables and the events {C n }: σ(F * ∩ C). 15 This does not always imply that the greater P ( ∞ n=1 C n ), the better. Indeed, the key is the appropriateness of each C n in an economic investigation. For example, in many cases it is appropriate to condition on sets of worlds C n that does not contain (say) world war III or other kinds of events that would reduce the precision of the investigation. denote the sets in which a discrete time volatility model is empirically congruent, and let C T denote the sets in which a continuous time volatility model is theory congruent.
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According to Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) discrete time low-frequency empirical models should be evaluated against high-frequency estimates based on continuous time theory. The trade-off facing the econometrician is to choose between the restriction
, that is, the restriction that both the discrete time and continuous time models are congruent, and
, that is, the probabilistically weaker restriction that only the discrete time model is congruent. 24-33), Punch (1998, pp. 47-48) and Crano and Brewer (2002, pp. 5-12) . That is, to what extent a measure (say, the number of people receiving unemployment benefits) is capable of providing information about a theoretical definition (say, the number of unemployed). An operational definition that satisfactorily provides the information sought is thus said to be measurement valid or concept valid.
To see that the collection of data variables does not alter the underlying probability space, recall that any realisation of the data variable U corresponds to the worlds 16 Strictly speaking congruency is a slightly different definition of "truth" than equality between P T and P D , although related. An empirical model is a congruent representation of the DGP if 1) the errors are innovations, 2) parameters are constant, 3) conditioning variables are weakly exogenous for the parameters of interest, 4) it is economically founded and 5) data admissibility, see Mizon (1995) , Hendry (1995) or Campos et al. (2005) . If one refers to this as empirical congruency, then one may say that a theory model is a congruent representation of the theory mechanism if 1) to 4) are satisfied.
in which the data were collected or could have been collected. For example, for any realisation u t of U t there is an associated set of possible worlds {ω : U t (ω) = u t } in which these data realisations can be obtained. Also, if we would like to restrict ourselves to the worlds enabled by history, then we can restrict ourselves to the intersection of {ω : U t (ω) = u t } and the set of possible worlds enabled by the course of history preceding t. 
where (t) , and think of the first as the theory variable and the second as the data variable. The elements of F, G * t and G t will be referred to as worldly events at t, theory events at t and data events at t, respectively. Measurement validity of the data event G t ∈ G t with respect to the theoretical event G * t ∈ G * t can now be defined in terms of equality between the worldly events {ω :
In words, to what extent the set of possible worlds associated with a certain data realisation equals the set of worlds associated with the theory event it purports to measure. Generalised the idea can be summarised in the following definition:
Definition 6. Measurement validity of data events. A data event G t ∈ G t is said to be: a) measurement valid with respect to a theory event G *
c) partially measurement valid with respect to a theory event G
For convenience we may say that a data event is measurement valid, invalid or partially valid, respectively, since it is implicitly understood that the validity is with respect to a certain theory event. The extensions to theoretical variables is more or less straightforward, but for convenience only the definition for measurement validity is provided:
Definition 7. Measurement validity of a data variable. A data vari-
Implicitly the definition thus assumes there is a theory variable U * t : (Ω, F) −→ (X * t , G * t ) defined on the probability space (Ω, F, P ). Finally, a definition of almost sure measurement validity can be formulated:
Definition 8. Almost sure measurement validity of a data variable.
Consider a data variable U t : (Ω, F) −→ (X t , G t ) and denote the set containing measurement valid data events for G
then U t said to be measurement valid almost surely.
A history based probabilistic definition of indeterministic causality
Discussions over what the appropriate definition of causality is for econometrics enjoys a reasonably long history, for overviews and references see amongst others Geweke (1984) , Aigner and Zellner (1988) , and . Most of the suggested definitions have put more weight on empirical implementability rather than philosophical rigour, which is understandable given econometrics' nature. In this sense the definition put forward here distinguishes itself by explicitly giving more weight to philosophical considerations rather than empirical implementation.
Indeed, I believe that the principal use of the definition of causality proposed here is conceptual analysis rather than empirical analysis.
A major drawback with deterministic versions of causality is that they do not accommodate a basic characteristic of human nature: In the majority of contexts that are relevant for the social sciences we seem to choose our own actions. Differently put, we seem to possess a free will. Probabilistic definitions of causality remedies this deficiency to some extent, and a well-known example is Granger (1969) The main characteristics of the definition is that it conceives causality as having two aspects, historical possibility and causal efficiency, and the section proceeds in four steps. In the first subsection the idea of historical possibility is introduced and discussed, and in the second causal efficiency. Subsection 5.4 brings out the most important similarities and differences between the proposed definition and David Lewis' ideas, whereas the final subsection relates the ideas in this section to a common definition of causality in econometrics, namely mathematical expectation conditional on an information set.
Historical possibility
The first aspect of causality is in a sense obvious. How can an event C be considered as a cause of another event E if the second event is not even possible given the first?
The approach to possibility pursued here is that of historical possibility, that is, the idea that what is possible tomorrow depends crucially on where we stand today. In other words, the course of history up to t determines what is possible at and after t. Before we can define this idea formally we need a definition of history.
Definition 9. History up to t. Let ω t be a state-of-affairs process up to t. The event H t = {ω : ω t ω} ∈ F is said to be a history up to t.
In words H t is the set of all possible worlds that contain the state-of-affairs process ω t and intuitively H t is exactly what its name suggests, namely history up to t. Now, a possible or historically possible event is defined as follows. Definition 10. A historically possible event. Let H t 1 , E t 2 ∈ F where t 1 ≤ t 2 and where H t 1 is a history up to t. E t 2 is said to be a possible event with respect to the history
In words, the event E t 2 at t 2 is said to be historically possible or possible for short if at least one of its worlds is contained in history H t 1 . Similarly, an event is impossible if E t 2 ∩ H t 1 = ∅, since H t by construction contains the set of all possible worlds containing the course of history up to and including t. A consequence of definition 10 is that situations where E t 2 ∩ H t 1 = ∅ and P (E t 2 ∩ H t 1 ) = 0, that is, that E t 2 is possible but probabilistically impossible, are not excluded from the outset.
Situations where the effect precedes its cause are on the other hand excluded from the outset by the condition t 1 ≤ t 2 .
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Another characteristic of the definition is that 17 This does not mean that conditional probabilities where the conditioning event succeeds the other event are meaningless-on the contrary. For example, the conditional probability P (E t1 |E t2 ) can be interpreted as the probability that a specific event at t 1 takes place given that another event takes place at t 2 . Differently put, conditional probabilities where the conditioning event succeeds the other event may shed light on spurious associations, since such conditioning probabilities are probabilistic measures of how events are related regardless of how they are physically related.
it allows for events being causal for some t but not necessarily at all t. In particular, the definition allows for socalled "single case" causality with "many case" causality being obtained as a reduction. Finally, the definition resolves a problem discussed by Salmon (1993b Salmon ( , 1993a . In his view the definitions of probabilistic causality put forward by Reichenbach (1956) , Good (1961 Good ( , 1962 Good ( and 1963 and Suppes (1970) all suffer from the fact "that they attempt to carry out the construction of causal relations on the basis of probabilistic relations among discrete events. . . " (1993b, p. 151) . In other words, they fail to take into account the continuous processes that connect events. Salmon (1993a) himself proposed a solution that takes "processes rather than events as basic entities" (same place, p. 155). The current approach follows a similar vein and thus constitutes an alternative to Salmon's approach.
Specifically the current approach takes continuous states-of-affairs processes (that is, worlds) as basic entities, with the consequence that discrete and continuous accounts-indeed, even interval accounts-of causality are reconciled within a single framework.
Causal efficiency
Defining possibility in this way means conditional probability suggests itself as a measure of causal efficiency. Heuristically a cause is said to be more efficient than another if the first is more likely to bring about the event in question, and formally we may define this as follows:
, and consider the event E t 2 ∈ F where How does all this relate to the more common idea of an event C t 1 being the cause of an effect E t 2 , most often expressed in terms of P (E t 2 |C t 1 )? The answer lies in the structure of the underlying outcome space. Recall that each element in the outcome space is devised as a continuous time process of states-of-affairs from 0 and onwards. This means P (E t 2 |C t 1 ) can be interpreted as the probability of the event E t 2 given the event C t 1 , and given history up to but not including t = 0. This is why bounding worlds backwards produces a particularly interesting interpretation of conditional probabilities. Moreover, it is not necessary for worlds to be unbounded forward for this interpretation to obtain. Worlds may just as well be devised as finite non-stochastic continuous time processes starting at t = 0 and ending when t = T .
Similarly, the probability P (E) where E is an arbitrary event can be interpreted as the probability of E coming about conditional on history up to but not including t = 0.
Conditional expectations re-interpreted
It is common in econometrics to model the impact of one set of variables on another by means of conditional expectations. In its general form such conditional expectations may be denoted E(X t |I = I), where X t is the random variable or variables in question, I is a σ-field contained in F and I ∈ I.
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A common example are socalled 18 Little is lost by restricting our attention to conditional expectations, since the conditional probability of an event A given and event B is obtained by taking the conditional expectation of the indicator function of A. For instance, E(I A |F = B) = P (A|B).
"filtrations". If X t = {X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X t } denotes as sequence of the random variable up to and including t, then the sequence of σ-fields generated by X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X t , commonly denoted I 0 , I 1 , . . . , I t and called "information-sets", is the filtration of X t if it is the case that I t−1 ⊂ I t and I t ⊂ F for each t. As a consequence, the conditional expectation E(X t |I t−1 = I t−1 ) is often referred to as the conditional expectation of X t on all the information available up to t, and sometimes even the true conditional expectation. This is a peculiar practice if the information-set is interpreted to contain what its name suggest, namely information.
The structure of the outcome space permits us to distinguish between two distinct but compatible and complementary ideas, history and information. Let I t ∈ F denote the event that an entity (a person, a group of persons, or whatever) possesses or uses a specific piece or pieces of information at t, and let H t ∈ F denote history up to and including t as defined above. Two useful distinctions can be made. Between correct and incorrect information of the past on the one hand, and between complete and incomplete information of the past on the other. More formally, sets of correct and incorrect information are characterised by I t ∩ H t = ∅ and I t ∩ H t = ∅, respectively, and sets of complete and incomplete correct information by I t ∩ H t = H t and I t ∩ H t H t , respectively. This gives three cases. The first case is when the information in the information-set is both correct and complete, and is of course entirely unrealistic. Formally, I t = H t . The second case is when I t contains some correct information, but not all the correct information that exists. Formally, I t ∩ H t = ∅ and I t H t . Finally, the third case is when I t contains incorrect information only.
The point I am driving at is intuitively obvious, namely that in practical econometrics our information is both incomplete and possibly incorrect, and that we use this suboptimal information in estimating conditional expectations. An attempt to formalise this idea could be the following. The "correct" or true expectation conditional on history is given by E(X t |F = H t ), whereas what the econometrician in practice estimates is E(X t |I t = I t ) where I t is an incomplete and possibly partially incorrect information set. Denoting this estimate byÊ(X t |I t = I t ), we may say that one of the key concerns of econometrics is that of efficiently choosing and making use of information such thatÊ(X t |I t = I t ) is as close to E(X t |F = H t ) as possible.
David Lewis' ideas compared
The account of causality outlined here is similar in so many ways to Lewis' account that one may ask where they actually differ. They do differ in many ways but the most important are three. The first was alluded to in subsection 3.1 and concerns the existence of possible worlds. Whereas Lewis believed other worlds exist objectively and independent of thought, I believe they originate in our imagination. Second, Lewis aims to provide a framework that "can serve alike under indeterminism or determinism" (1986d, p. 179). The account outlined here on the other hand has been formulated with indeterminism in mind, and I am not ready to say yet how related they are in the case when the outcome space only contains a single world, which can be interpreted as a version of determinism. Third, Lewis' account "is in terms of counterfactual conditionals about probability; not in terms of conditional probabilities" (same place, p. 178). Here, conditional probability is one of two aspects of causality and (formal) counterfactual conditionals play no role.
With respect to similarities the most important is how close my ideas regarding causality are to Lewis' (1986a) view on causal explanation-in particular sections I and II (same place). Another similarity concerns the interpretation of probability.
Events, that is, elements of F, are sets of possible worlds, and the conditional probability (say) P (E|C) is the objective propensity of the event C to bring about the event E. In other words, conditional probability may apply to single instances of cases. The propensity (probability) is interpreted in the objective sense as opposed to the subjective, but this should not be interpreted as a critique against subjective accounts of probability. Indeed, in the words of Lewis:
"We subjectivists conceive of probability as the measure of reasonable partial belief. But we need not make war against other conceptions of probability, declaring that where subjective credence leaves off, there nonsense begins. Along with subjective credence we should believe also in objective chance. The practice and analysis of science require both concepts"-(1986e, p. 83).
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Conclusions
This essay has argued that the underlying outcome space in Hendry's (1995, Chap- ter 9) reduction theory can usefully be interpreted as consisting of indeterministic worlds made up of historically inherited particulars. Although the human world is changing all the time in indeterministic ways, the interpretation means reductions can be analysed on the same underlying probability space. This enables several new reductions, concepts and interpretations, of which only a few have been explored in this essay. First, the formulation of theoretical variables can be seen as the "perspective" from which an issue is studied. Second, ways of analysing the reductions implied by theory models are suggested. Third, probabilistic definitions of the absence of measurement error are put forward. Fourth, a history based probabilistic definition of indeterministic causality that nests discrete, continuous, "interval" and process versions is proposed. Fifth, mathematical expectation conditional on an information set is re-interpreted. Finally and more generally, a bridge between econometric (/probabilistic) reduction analysis and metaphysics is provided.
This opens up many possible lines for further research within the philosophy, theory and practice of econometrics, but only one is outlined here. The notion of weak stationarity plays a central role in dynamic econometrics and is cast in terms of marginal entities. To recall, a series {Y t } T t=1 is defined as weakly stationary if E(Y t ) = µ for all t, and given any t we have that E(Y t − µ)(Y j − µ) = ρ j for all j (that is, ρ j does not depend on t). However, according to the commonplace ontology of social reality everything in the human world is conditional, and so it seems natural that this is taken into account in the definition of weak stationarity. Specifically, a straightforward extension is to reformulate the definition of weak stationarity as conditional on a collection of events. Indeed, I would be very surprised if such a definition has not already been proposed and used (although I am unaware of one in the econometric literature). Denote a collection of such conditioning events as Order. This would provide a conceptual solution and a unifying framework to study such ideas as co-breaking (Hendry and Massmann 2005) , changing "unconditional" volatilities (Engle and Gonzalo 2005 ; how can changes in unconditional volatiliy be explained unless the change is due to a change in economic or other circumstances?) and "common features" (Engle and Kozicki 1993) . 
Starting point and resulting reduction Action
The economic mechanism under study: The theory variables U * = (U * 1 , ..., U * T ) defined on the probability space (Ω, F, P ) Data collection and recording of U t ∈ U, that is, the process of trying to measure the U * t ∈ U * variables 1.
The data generation process (DGP):
The data set U = (U 1 , ..., U T ) defined on the transformed probability space (Ω , F , P ) Starting points and resulting reductions Action A probability space (Ω, F, P ), where the outcome-space Ω consists of possible worlds made up of indeterministic and historically inherited particulars
The delineation and definition of a set of theory variables U * = (U * 1 , . . . , U * T )
1. The economic mechanism under study: The theory variables U * = (U * 1 , ..., U * T ) defined on the probability space (Ω, F, P ) and the theoretical probability function P * Data collection and recording of U t ∈ U, that is, the process of trying to measure the U * t ∈ U * variables 2.
The data generation process (DGP): A data realisation u = (u 1 , . . . , u T ) of the data variables U = (U 1 , . . . , U T ) defined on the probability space (Ω, F, P )
